# Is Curaçao helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Curaçao's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Curaçao moved €1m (0.03% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia, mostly earnings from sales to Russia (€2m; the other parts take €1m off it)). The net is 0.03% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CUW)

Toward Russia by

0.03% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.03% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.03%

€1m

likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Curaçao moved €1m (0.03% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia, mostly earnings from sales to Russia (€2m; the other parts take €1m off it)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.04% of GDP less (€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.36% toward Ukraine)
- Curaçao's own gain from trade with Russia: Curaçao kept 0.07% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely <0.01% to 0.41% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Small economy A small economy (GDP €3.1bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €1m

| Curaçao kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.06% | €2m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.03% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.02% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.03% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.03% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold €2m to Russia in 2021 and €32m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

Curaçao is a territory of Netherlands. We did not check whether the sanctions of Netherlands on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Curaçao itself; it names Netherlands. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CUW)

## How the number is backed

11 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 7 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 69% modelled (C) and 31% rough indications (D). No data: Fuel and goods bought from Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)

## Questions

### Is Curaçao helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 59%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Curaçao moved €1m (0.03% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia, mostly earnings from sales to Russia (€2m; the other parts take €1m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is Curaçao's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries.

### Where do the numbers for Curaçao come from?

11 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Curaçao kept more from selling to Russia: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Curaçao have sanctions on Russia?

Curaçao is a territory of Netherlands. We did not check whether the sanctions of Netherlands on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Curaçao itself; it names Netherlands.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Cayman Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/cayman-islands/) · −0.02% · Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- [Malawi](https://warbalance.org/country/malawi/) · −0.02% · Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- [Vietnam](https://warbalance.org/country/vietnam/) · −0.03% · Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
- Curaçao−0.03% · Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%
- [Australia](https://warbalance.org/country/australia/) · −0.04% · Essentially zero · −€607m · 76%
- [Zimbabwe](https://warbalance.org/country/zimbabwe/) · −0.05% · Essentially zero · −€17m · 55%
- [Zambia](https://warbalance.org/country/zambia/) · −0.05% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 57%

## More about Curaçao

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

11 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CUW) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/curacao/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/curacao/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/curacao/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/curacao/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/curacao/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/curacao/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/curacao/