# Is Cuba helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Cuba's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.37% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 65%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CUB)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.37% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 65%

likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine · €78m · ≈ 0.08%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.37% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

likely from 0.01% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.37%

€78m

likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 65%

Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.36% of GDP less (€77m; likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine)
- Cuba's own gain from trade with Russia: Cuba kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €96m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €86m of the net's €78m.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 91% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.37% · €78m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.41% | €86m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.04% | €8m |
| Cuba kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€31m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€31m | −€31m | −0.15% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | +€21m | +€21m | −0.05% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€26m | +€26m | +0.07% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | +€26m | +€25m | +0.19% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€37m | +€37m | +0.37% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.17bn from Russia in 2021 and €82m in 2025 (−53%). It sold €5m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 44.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Cuba: €8m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Cuba's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.67bn | €0.16bnrange €40m to €0.45bn | €0.53bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €0.58bn | €0.15bnrange €38m to €0.43bn | €0.52bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0.74bn | €0.20bn | – | – |
| All goods | €2bn | €0.51bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Cuba's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cuba. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CUB)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €95m extra from 2022 (0.45% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €96m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Ecuador](https://warbalance.org/country/ecuador/) | +0.37% · +€0.41bn · likely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| [Bolivia](https://warbalance.org/country/bolivia/) | +0.44% · +€0.22bn · likely toward Ukraine · 82% |
| [Honduras](https://warbalance.org/country/honduras/) | +0.24% · +€76m · likely toward Ukraine · 74% |
| [Colombia](https://warbalance.org/country/colombia/) | +0.15% · +€0.52bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |

## How the number is backed

15 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (35%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Cuba kept less from services sold to Russia C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)

## Questions

### Is Cuba helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.37% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.2% toward Russia to 3.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 65%). Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Cuba trade with Russia?

It bought €82m from Russia in 2025 (€0.17bn in 2021), and sold €4m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €78m (0.37% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Does Cuba still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 44.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €82m of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.17bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### What decides Cuba's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 65%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 91% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Where do the numbers for Cuba come from?

15 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Cuba kept less from services sold to Russia: [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Cuba have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Cuba's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cuba.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Rwanda](https://warbalance.org/country/rwanda/) · +0.55% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€74m · 90%
- [Austria](https://warbalance.org/country/austria/) · +0.45% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€2.1bn · 68%
- [Bolivia](https://warbalance.org/country/bolivia/) · +0.44% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€217m · 82%
- Cuba+0.37% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€78m · 65%
- [Ecuador](https://warbalance.org/country/ecuador/) · +0.37% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€411m · 89%
- [Montenegro](https://warbalance.org/country/montenegro/) · +0.37% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€25m · 91%
- [Burundi](https://warbalance.org/country/burundi/) · +0.29% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€10m · 73%

## More about Cuba

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

15 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CUB) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/cuba/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/cuba/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/cuba/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/cuba/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/cuba/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/cuba/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cuba/