# Is the Cook Islands helping Russia? What the money flows show

The Cook Islands' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Cook Islands moved €3m (0.84% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cook Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m of €3m)). The net is 0.84% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.48% to 1.7% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#COK)

Toward Russia by

0.84% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.48% to 1.7% toward Russia · €3m · ≈ 0.18%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.84% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.84%

€3m

likely 0.48% to 1.7% toward Russia very likely · >99%

The Cook Islands moved €3m (0.84% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cook Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m of €3m)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.52% of GDP more (€2m; likely 0.26% to 0.91% toward Russia)
- The Cook Islands' own gain from trade with Russia: The Cook Islands kept 0.32% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely 0.08% to 1.1% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia.
- Ships Russian oil The Cook Islands kept €1m (0.32% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 100% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €380m): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.84% · €3m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.52% | €2m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The Cook Islands kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −0.32% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€1m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.08% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | €0 | −€1m | −€1m | −0.32% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.56% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.73% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.84% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

The Cook Islands is a territory of New Zealand. We did not check whether the sanctions of New Zealand on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Cook Islands itself; it names New Zealand. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#COK)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €2m (0.52% of one year's GDP). The Cook Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil: €1m (0.32% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

7 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 5 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D). No data: Fuel and goods bought from Russia · Sales to Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### The Cook Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil D

- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)

## Questions

### Is the Cook Islands helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.84% of one year's GDP (likely 0.48% to 1.7% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Cook Islands moved €3m (0.84% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cook Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m of €3m)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for the Cook Islands come from?

7 sources back its parts, 0 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); The Cook Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil: [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does the Cook Islands have sanctions on Russia?

The Cook Islands is a territory of New Zealand. We did not check whether the sanctions of New Zealand on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Cook Islands itself; it names New Zealand.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia

18. [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) · −0.71% · Toward Russia · −€525m
- [Vanuatu](https://warbalance.org/country/vanuatu/) · −0.74% · Toward Russia · −€8m
17. [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) · −0.75% · Toward Russia · −€128bn
- Cook Islands−0.84% · Toward Russia · −€3m
16. [Mauritius](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritius/) · −0.86% · Toward Russia · −€112m
15. [Sri Lanka](https://warbalance.org/country/sri-lanka/) · −0.87% · Toward Russia · −€698m
14. [Ghana](https://warbalance.org/country/ghana/) · −0.92% · Toward Russia · −€678m

## More about Cook Islands

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

7 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#COK) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/cook-islands/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/cook-islands/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/cook-islands/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/cook-islands/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/cook-islands/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/cook-islands/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cook-islands/