# Is the Comoros helping Russia? What the money flows show

The Comoros' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Comoros moved €7m (0.48% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Comoros kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €7m)). The net is 0.48% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#COM)

Toward Russia by

0.48% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia · €7m · ≈ 0.10%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.48% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.48%

€7m

likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia very likely · >99%

The Comoros moved €7m (0.48% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Comoros kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €7m)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.31% of GDP more (€4m; likely 0.15% to 0.54% toward Russia)
- The Comoros' own gain from trade with Russia: The Comoros kept 0.17% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely 0.04% to 0.59% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Ships Russian oil The Comoros kept €2m (0.17% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 99% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €1.4bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.48% · €7m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.31% | €4m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The Comoros kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −0.17% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€2m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.06% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −0.19% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −0.30% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.41% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.48% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For the Comoros: €0 paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of the Comoros' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Comoros. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#COM)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €4m (0.31% of one year's GDP). The Comoros kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (0.17% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

7 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 5 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### The Comoros kept more from shipping Russian oil D

- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)

## Questions

### Is the Comoros helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.48% of one year's GDP (likely 0.27% to 0.96% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Comoros moved €7m (0.48% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Comoros kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€4m of €7m)). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for the Comoros come from?

7 sources back its parts, 0 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); The Comoros kept more from shipping Russian oil: [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does the Comoros have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of the Comoros' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Comoros.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia

25. [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) · −0.35% · Toward Russia · −€183m
24. [Maldives](https://warbalance.org/country/maldives/) · −0.41% · Toward Russia · −€25m
23. [Iran](https://warbalance.org/country/iran/) · −0.44% · Toward Russia · −€1.9bn
- Comoros−0.48% · Toward Russia · −€7m
22. [Jamaica](https://warbalance.org/country/jamaica/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€94m
21. [South Africa](https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€1.8bn
20. [Brazil](https://warbalance.org/country/brazil/) · −0.51% · Toward Russia · −€10.1bn

## More about Comoros

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

7 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#COM) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/comoros/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/comoros/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/comoros/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/comoros/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/comoros/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/comoros/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/comoros/