# Does China support Russia? What the money flows show

China's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€0.52bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 0.75% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CHN)

Toward Russia by

0.75% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia · €128bn · ≈ 0.16%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.75% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€521m

likely from 0.02% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.74%

€128bn

likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia very likely · >99%

China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.60% of GDP more (€103bn; likely 0.18% to 0.93% toward Russia)
- China's own gain from trade with Russia: China kept 0.15% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€25.3bn; likely 0.07% to 0.30% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €18.1bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 75% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €60.7bn in 2021, €106bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 67% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €57.4bn in 2021, €95.6bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €23.5bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €23.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €15.5bn. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Armed Russia: €1.3bn delivered Weapons, ammunition, drones or troops delivered to Russia: €1.3bn at full value. In the totals: €39m, because what Russia paid for counts at the seller's own gain, like any sale.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €521m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €574m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €89m |
| China kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D | −<0.01% | €20m |
| China kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −<0.01% | €20m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €2m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.74% · €128bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.48% | €82.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| China earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC | −0.10% | €18.0bn |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.09% | €15.4bn |
| China's companies made more profit in RussiaC | −0.02% | €4.0bn |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxC | −0.02% | €3.7bn |
| China kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.01% | €2.4bn |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €650m |
| Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD | −<0.01% | €480m |
| China earned more from Russian oil and gas stakesC | −<0.01% | €422m |
| China kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −<0.01% | €206m |
| China kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −<0.01% | €182m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereC | +<0.01% | €177m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €45m |
| Weapons and troops sent to RussiaD | −<0.01% | €39m |
| China kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €27m |
| Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansD | +<0.01% | €17m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€34.8bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€161m | −€20.8bn | −€21.0bn | −0.12% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€20m | −€29.2bn | −€29.2bn | −0.29% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€59m | −€34.7bn | −€34.8bn | −0.49% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€184m | −€22.5bn | −€22.6bn | −0.63% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€97m | −€20.7bn | −€20.8bn | −0.75% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

China's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0mKiel: €0m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €89mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €89m |
| Humanitarian aid | €2m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€0.57bn |
| Money flowing back | −€39msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€0.52bn |

Quality of the split: A

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## China–Russia trade

It bought €60.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €106bn in 2025 (+75%). It sold €57.4bn to Russia in 2021 and €95.6bn in 2025 (+67%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 67.0% of what it bought from Russia. For China: €15.4bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 46% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

China's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €257bn | €217bnrange €183bn to €253bn | €236bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €29.6bn | €28.3bnrange €24.1bn to €32.8bn | €28.6bn | C (estimate) |
| Pipeline gas | €31.9bn | €30.8bnrange €26bn to €35.9bn | €31.3bn | C (estimate) |
| LNG | €23.3bn | €22.5bnrange €19.3bn to €25.9bn | €20bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €44.7bn | €43.1bnrange €36.4bn to €50bn | €37.1bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €151bn | €174bn | – | – |
| All goods | €538bn | €515bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: B, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. China has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (9 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name China. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Chinese MFA spokesperson, 9 March 2022 (news report)](https://www.tbsnews.net/node/377803) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CHN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €18.1bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€2.3bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in China; what its firms kept of it, €39m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

China's companies made more profit in Russia: €4bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €3.7bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). China earned more from Russian oil and gas stakes: €0.42bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €741m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €399m to €1.4bn; <0.01% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.65bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €0.48bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). China kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.21bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). China kept more from settling Russia's trade: €0.18bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €23.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €18.6bn to €31.8bn); €3.3bn in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals. Dual-use goods (machine tools, electronics, components) in recorded exports to Russia, 2022–2026: €23.2bn. They are counted in the sales to Russia above, not again as military support.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 17 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 2 of 6 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) | +0.14% · +€20m · likely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/) | +0.02% · +€55m · essentially zero |
| [Vietnam](https://warbalance.org/country/vietnam/) | −0.03% · −€0.10bn · essentially zero |
| [Myanmar](https://warbalance.org/country/myanmar/) | −0.05% · −€35m · essentially zero |
| [Macao](https://warbalance.org/country/macao/) | −0.06% · −€24m · essentially zero |
| [Pakistan](https://warbalance.org/country/pakistan/) | −0.07% · −€0.24bn · essentially zero |
| [Tajikistan](https://warbalance.org/country/tajikistan/) | −0.40% · −€46m · too close to call · 58% toward Russia |
| China | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) | −1.5% · −€0.24bn · very likely · 98% |
| [Hong Kong](https://warbalance.org/country/hong-kong/) | −1.6% · −€5.8bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| [India](https://warbalance.org/country/india/) | −2.2% · −€70.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Bhutan](https://warbalance.org/country/bhutan/) | −2.5% · −€71m · very likely · >99% |
| [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) | −2.5% · −€0.97bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Mongolia](https://warbalance.org/country/mongolia/) | −6.4% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |
| [Kyrgyzstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kyrgyzstan/) | −10.0% · −€1.4bn · very likely · 97% |
| [North Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/north-korea/) | −19.9% · −€5.9bn · Party to the war |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Malaysia](https://warbalance.org/country/malaysia/) | −0.64% · −€2.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Sri Lanka](https://warbalance.org/country/sri-lanka/) | −0.87% · −€0.70bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Maldives](https://warbalance.org/country/maldives/) | −0.41% · −€25m · very likely · >99% |
| [Fiji](https://warbalance.org/country/fiji/) | −0.35% · −€18m · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

42 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 11 research reports, 2 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian crude refined in Turkey and India and exported as fuel: refinery reports, UN Comtrade, CREA, Global Witness](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=792&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X&period=2024)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### China earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions C

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### China's companies made more profit in Russia C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia more tax C

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian crude refined in Turkey and India and exported as fuel: refinery reports, UN Comtrade, CREA, Global Witness](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=792&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X&period=2024)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- press · [Power of Siberia: contracted gas deliveries to China (Gazprom's 2014 CNPC contract, 38 bcm a year; yearly volumes via Interfax, TASS and Reuters)](https://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/may/article191451/)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [War-time gas price windfall under the pre-war no-war price paths: World Bank and IMF October-2021 forecasts, IMF/EIA/ECB January-2022 views, ICE TTF futures of mid-February 2022 and of early 2021 (TTF Cal-22 at EUR 16.7-18.1/MWh, January-March 2021); each contract's TTF/oil formula](https://www.ice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Natural-Gas-Futures/data)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Gold and hidden payment channels to Russia not in customs data: Swissaid, Reuters, Hong Kong and Kyrgyz trade gaps](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [China's military support to Russia not in recorded trade: CSIS, RUSI, KSE, Reuters, US and EU findings](https://sanctions.kse.ua/?p=13285)
- press · [How Russia paid for weapons and troops: INSS (via Bloomberg and The Insider), NK News, Bloomberg via Militarnyi; outdated North Korean stock: Ukraine's military intelligence via Reuters](https://theins.press/en/news/290450)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

## Questions

### Does China support Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.75% of one year's GDP (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. Weapons and troops it sent to Russia (about €1.3bn at full value) are listed on Russia's panel; in the totals they count at the seller's gain. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### China–Russia trade: how much since 2022?

It bought €106bn from Russia in 2025 (€60.7bn in 2021), and sold €95.6bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia).

### China–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €106bn from Russia in 2025 (€60.7bn in 2021), and sold €95.6bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.52bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.75% of one year's GDP (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does China still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 67.0% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €106bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €60.7bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### How does China compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, Vietnam −0.03%, Myanmar −0.05%, Macao −0.06%, Pakistan −0.07%, Tajikistan −0.40%, China −0.75%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Hong Kong −1.6%, India −2.2%, Bhutan −2.5%, Nepal −2.5%, Mongolia −6.4%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%, North Korea −19.9%. In the map's ranking: number 17 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for China come from?

42 sources back its parts, 11 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); China earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions: [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does China have sanctions on Russia?

No. China has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (9 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name China. Sources: [Chinese MFA spokesperson, 9 March 2022 (news report)](https://www.tbsnews.net/node/377803) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 17 of 32

- [Niue](https://warbalance.org/country/niue/) · −0.67% · Toward Russia · −<€1m
18. [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) · −0.71% · Toward Russia · −€525m
- [Vanuatu](https://warbalance.org/country/vanuatu/) · −0.74% · Toward Russia · −€8m
17. China−0.75% · Toward Russia · −€128bn
- [Cook Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/cook-islands/) · −0.84% · Toward Russia · −€3m
16. [Mauritius](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritius/) · −0.86% · Toward Russia · −€112m
15. [Sri Lanka](https://warbalance.org/country/sri-lanka/) · −0.87% · Toward Russia · −€698m

## More about China

### Groups

- [BRICS](https://warbalance.org/group/brics/)

### Compared with

- [India vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/india-vs-china/)
- [United States vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-china/)
- [China vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-turkiye/)
- [China vs Iran](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-iran/)
- [China vs Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-kazakhstan/)
- [Brazil vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/brazil-vs-china/)
- [China vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-japan/)
- [United Arab Emirates vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-arab-emirates-vs-china/)
- [China vs South Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-south-korea/)
- [China vs North Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-north-korea/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Gold and hidden payments to Russia](https://warbalance.org/gold-and-hidden-payments-to-russia/)
- [Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects](https://warbalance.org/stakes-in-russian-oil-and-gas-projects/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

42 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CHN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/china/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/china/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/china/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/china/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/china/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/china/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/china/