# How much has Chile given to Ukraine since 2022?

Chile's support for Ukraine since 2022: €5m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €102m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€89m of €102m). The net is 0.04% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CHL)

Toward Ukraine by

0.04% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 99%

likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine · €107m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.04% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€5m

likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.03%

€102m

likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €102m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€89m of €102m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.03% of GDP less (€98m; likely <0.01% to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
- Chile's own gain from trade with Russia: Chile kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€4m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €5m

| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €102m

| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesC | +0.03% | €89m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +<0.01% | €18m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €10m |
| Chile kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €6m |
| Chile kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€45m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€1m | +€45m | +€45m | +0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2m | +€29m | +€31m | +0.03% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€2m | +€1m | +€3m | +0.03% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | +€15m | +€15m | +0.03% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€1m | +€11m | +€12m | +0.04% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Chile's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €5mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €5m |
| Refugee hosting | €1m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €5m |

Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.16bn from Russia in 2021 and €18m in 2025 (−89%). It sold €0.52bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.44bn in 2025 (−16%). For Chile: €10m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Chile's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Chile. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CHL)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €57m extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 32 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bolivia](https://warbalance.org/country/bolivia/) | +0.44% · +€0.22bn · likely toward Ukraine · 82% |
| [Peru](https://warbalance.org/country/peru/) | +0.07% · +€0.19bn · essentially zero |
| [Argentina](https://warbalance.org/country/argentina/) | +0.05% · +€0.31bn · essentially zero |
| Chile | +0.04% · +€0.11bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) | +0.51% · +€132bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) | +0.51% · +€10.6bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

24 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries C

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Chile kept less from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

### Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C

- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

## Questions

### Is Chile helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.04% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €102m (0.03% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€89m of €102m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much has Chile given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €5m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### How does Chile compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bolivia +0.44%, Peru +0.07%, Argentina +0.05%, Chile +0.04%. In the map's ranking: number 32 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Chile come from?

24 sources back its parts, 8 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Chile have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Chile's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Chile.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 32 of 32

29. [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€132bn
30. [Nigeria](https://warbalance.org/country/nigeria/) · +0.42% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.8bn
31. [Japan](https://warbalance.org/country/japan/) · +0.30% · Toward Ukraine · +€12.2bn
32. Chile+0.04% · Toward Ukraine · +€107m
- [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) · +3.3% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€3.1bn · 95%
- [Brunei](https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/) · +3.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€453m · 85%
- [Lebanon](https://warbalance.org/country/lebanon/) · +2.8% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€578m · 84%

## More about Chile

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

24 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CHL) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/chile/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/chile/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/chile/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/chile/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/chile/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/chile/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/chile/