# Is the Central African Republic helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

The Central African Republic's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €116m (4.8% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly payments and resources to Russian forces (Wagner / Africa Corps) (€106m of €116m). The net is 4.8% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.79% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 92%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CAF)

Leaning toward Russia by

4.8% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 92%

likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.79% toward Ukraine · €115m · ≈ 1.0%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 4.8% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)).

Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

4.8%

€116m

likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.78% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 92%

Russia kept €116m (4.8% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly payments and resources to Russian forces (Wagner / Africa Corps) (€106m of €116m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 4.8% of GDP more (€116m; likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.78% toward Ukraine)
- The Central African Republic's own gain from trade with Russia: The Central African Republic kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian forces in the country Wagner Group or Russia's Africa Corps operated here: 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026. Paid to them and taken by their firms, at Russia's gain, against 2021: €106m.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 99% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps): €106m of the net's €115m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €2.4bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps).

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 4.8% · €116m

| Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D | −4.4% | €106m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.26% | €6m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereD | −0.15% | €4m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€38m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −€20m | −€20m | −0.83% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€38m | −€38m | −2.4% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | −€26m | −€26m | −3.5% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −€19m | −€19m | −4.4% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −€12m | −€11m | −4.8% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1m from Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For the Central African Republic: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of the Central African Republic's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Central African Republic. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CAF)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €6m (0.26% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

11 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (30%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps) D

- research · [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here D

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

- research · [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)

## Questions

### Is the Central African Republic helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −4.8% of one year's GDP (likely from 13.8% toward Russia to 0.79% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 92%). Chance toward Russia: 92%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €116m (4.8% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly payments and resources to Russian forces (Wagner / Africa Corps) (€106m of €116m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for the Central African Republic come from?

11 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps): [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does the Central African Republic have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of the Central African Republic's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Central African Republic.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Senegal](https://warbalance.org/country/senegal/) · −2.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€600m · 76%
- [Burkina Faso](https://warbalance.org/country/burkina-faso/) · −3.9% · Leaning toward Russia · −€749m · 92%
- [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) · −4.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.2bn · 87%
- Central African Republic−4.8% · Leaning toward Russia · −€115m · 92%
- [Mongolia](https://warbalance.org/country/mongolia/) · −6.4% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.2bn · 77%
32. [Papua New Guinea](https://warbalance.org/country/papua-new-guinea/) · −0.08% · Toward Russia · −€22m
31. [Barbados](https://warbalance.org/country/barbados/) · −0.09% · Toward Russia · −€6m

## More about Central African Republic

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

11 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CAF) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/central-african-republic/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/central-african-republic/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/central-african-republic/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/central-african-republic/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/central-african-republic/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/central-african-republic/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/central-african-republic/