# Is the Cayman Islands helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

The Cayman Islands' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Cayman Islands moved €2m (0.02% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cayman Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take <€1m off it)). The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CYM)

Toward Russia by

0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine · €2m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.02%

€2m

likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine essentially zero

The Cayman Islands moved €2m (0.02% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cayman Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take <€1m off it)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.02% of GDP more (€1m; likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.27% toward Ukraine)
- The Cayman Islands' own gain from trade with Russia: The Cayman Islands kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 60% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €2m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €2m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.02% | €1m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.02% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The one year with a net amount of note was 2024: −€1m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.02% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.02% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | −0.02% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

The Cayman Islands is a British overseas territory: the UK's sanctions on Russia apply there through the Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020. Separately, Russia lists the Cayman Islands as an “unfriendly” state (government order 3216-r, 29 October 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Cayman Islands. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [The Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020 (SI 2020/1571), Schedule 1](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/1571/schedule/1/made)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 29 October 2022 No. 3216-r amending the list (scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202210310047)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CYM)

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

## How the number is backed

9 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 34% modelled (C) and 66% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

### Its firms paid Russia more tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is the Cayman Islands helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Cayman Islands moved €2m (0.02% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and the Cayman Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take <€1m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is the Cayman Islands' net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.26% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax.

### Where do the numbers for the Cayman Islands come from?

9 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from services sold here: [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021); Its firms paid Russia more tax: [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does the Cayman Islands have sanctions on Russia?

The Cayman Islands is a British overseas territory: the UK's sanctions on Russia apply there through the Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020. Separately, Russia lists the Cayman Islands as an “unfriendly” state (government order 3216-r, 29 October 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Cayman Islands. Sources: [The Russia (Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 2020 (SI 2020/1571), Schedule 1](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/1571/schedule/1/made); [Government of Russia, Order of 29 October 2022 No. 3216-r amending the list (scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202210310047).

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Nicaragua](https://warbalance.org/country/nicaragua/) · −0.01% · Essentially zero · −€2m · 50%
- [Qatar](https://warbalance.org/country/qatar/) · −0.02% · Essentially zero · −€32m · 60%
- [Bahrain](https://warbalance.org/country/bahrain/) · −0.02% · Essentially zero · −€8m · 53%
- Cayman Islands−0.02% · Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- [Malawi](https://warbalance.org/country/malawi/) · −0.02% · Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- [Vietnam](https://warbalance.org/country/vietnam/) · −0.03% · Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
- [Curaçao](https://warbalance.org/country/curacao/) · −0.03% · Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%

## More about Cayman Islands

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

9 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CYM) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cayman-islands/