# How much has Canada given to Ukraine since 2022?

Canada's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8.8bn (0.42% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €95m of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.51% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CAN)

Toward Ukraine by

0.51% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukraine · €10.6bn · ≈ 0.11%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.51% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.42%

€8.8bn

likely 0.30% to 0.68% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.08%

€1.7bn

likely 0.02% to 0.15% toward Ukraine very likely · 98%

Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.08% of GDP less (€1.7bn; likely 0.02% to 0.15% toward Ukraine)
- Canada's own gain from trade with Russia: Canada kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€89m; likely from 0.03% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€95m).

## Its story in short

- Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €1.6bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 39% was required by sanctions it set itself (petroleum import ban of March 2022), 61% went beyond them.
- Bought 96% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.4bn in 2021, €52m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.42% · €8.8bn

| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +0.32% | €6.6bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesC | +0.09% | €1.8bn |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €425m |
| Canada kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €51m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €46m |
| Canada kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB | −<0.01% | €40m |
| Canada kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €13m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €12m |
| Canada kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Canada kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)B | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Canada kept part of others' aid, spent hereB | −<0.01% | €2m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.08% · €1.7bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.07% | €1.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €97m |
| Canada's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €91m |
| Canada kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €23m |
| Russian owners kept less from their firms hereD | +<0.01% | €20m |
| Canada kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €19m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €15m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €6m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Canada kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €2m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €95m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD | +<0.01% | €77m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereC | +<0.01% | €18m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€3bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €2.5bn in 2022 to €1.3bn in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2.5bn | +€508m | +€11m | +€3.0bn | +0.14% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2.1bn | +€366m | +€30m | +€2.5bn | +0.26% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€1.5bn | +€308m | +€27m | +€1.8bn | +0.35% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€1.3bn | +€284m | +€18m | +€1.6bn | +0.43% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€1.4bn | +€282m | +€10m | +€1.7bn | +0.51% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Canada's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €4.3bnrange €3.2bn to €6.6bn; Kiel: €5.8bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €1.7bnof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €45m |
| Humanitarian aid | €0.61bn |
| Refugee hosting | €1.8bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.44bn |
| Money flowing back | −€0.11bnsubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €8.8bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €52m in 2025 (−96%). It sold €0.44bn to Russia in 2021 and €85m in 2025 (−81%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 31.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Canada: €4m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 39% required by sanctions it set itself, 61% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Canada has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 17 March 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Canada as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Canada. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, SOR/2014-58](https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2014-58/index.html)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CAN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €80m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€95m; likely €29m to €484m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €0.11bn (November 2025, [source](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/11/06/where-are-the-russian-immobilised-assets-nobody-except-belgium-wants-to-say) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).

## Refugees from Ukraine

240,000 refugees from Ukraine, 5.8 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.8bn (0.09% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Canada: €2.4bn spent on refugees, less €573m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €14.9bn; counted here: €6.6bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; G7 loans repaid from Russian assets left out (Russia pays for them); military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €5.1bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.53bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €1.6bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €1.3bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€2.1bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Canada; what its firms kept of it, €0.11bn, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Its firms paid Russia less tax: €97m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Canada's companies made less profit in Russia: €91m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €780m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €411m to €1.8bn; 0.04% of a year's GDP.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 28 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. G7: number 5 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 22 of 23 members toward Ukraine.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Canada | +0.51% · +€10.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) | +0.51% · +€132bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) | +0.51% · +€132bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) | +0.04% · +€0.11bn · very likely · 99% |

## How the number is backed

39 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 93% modelled (C) and 7% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Aid: weapons, money, loans C

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)

### Private donations D

- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia less tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- research · [Russian-owned metals, mining and chemicals plants abroad (Rusal, NLMK, Nornickel, EuroChem): company filings and parent reports](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=A&reporter=IE&partner=RU&product=281820&flow=2&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)

## Questions

### How much has Canada given to Ukraine?

Canada's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €8.8bn, 0.42% of one year's GDP (likely 0.30% to 0.68%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Is Canada helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Canada–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €52m from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €85m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €8.8bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Canada trade with Russia?

It bought €52m from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €85m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Did Canada cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 39% required by sanctions it set itself, 61% beyond what sanctions required.

### How much did Canada give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €2.5bn; 2023 €2.1bn; 2024 €1.5bn; 2025 €1.3bn; 2026 (to August) €1.4bn. In total since 2022: €8.8bn (likely 0.30% to 0.68%).

### Does Canada have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Canada has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 17 March 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Canada as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Canada. Sources: [Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, SOR/2014-58](https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2014-58/index.html); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 28 of 32

25. [Spain](https://warbalance.org/country/spain/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€16.6bn
26. [South Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/south-korea/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€18.1bn
27. [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) · +1.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.7bn
28. Canada+0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€10.6bn
29. [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€132bn
30. [Nigeria](https://warbalance.org/country/nigeria/) · +0.42% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.8bn
31. [Japan](https://warbalance.org/country/japan/) · +0.30% · Toward Ukraine · +€12.2bn

## More about Canada

### Groups

- [G7](https://warbalance.org/group/g7/)
- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Compared with

- [Canada vs United States](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-united-states/)
- [Germany vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-canada/)
- [Netherlands vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/netherlands-vs-canada/)
- [United Kingdom vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-kingdom-vs-canada/)
- [France vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/france-vs-canada/)
- [Poland vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/poland-vs-canada/)
- [Norway vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-canada/)
- [Italy vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/italy-vs-canada/)
- [Denmark vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/denmark-vs-canada/)
- [Sweden vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/sweden-vs-canada/)
- [Canada vs Spain](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-spain/)
- [Canada vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-switzerland/)
- [Canada vs Ireland](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-ireland/)
- [Canada vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-belgium/)
- [Canada vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-japan/)
- [Canada vs Finland](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-finland/)
- [Canada vs Czechia](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-czechia/)
- [Canada vs Austria](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-austria/)
- [Canada vs Romania](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-romania/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Refugee spending kept in the host economy](https://warbalance.org/refugee-spending-in-host-economies/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Aid to Ukraine spent at home](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-at-home/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

39 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CAN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/canada/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/canada/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/canada/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/canada/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/canada/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/canada/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/canada/