# Is Cambodia helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Cambodia's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €31m (0.08% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€27m of €31m). The net is 0.08% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.29% toward Russia to 0.37% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#KHM)

Toward Russia by

0.08% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.29% toward Russia to 0.37% toward Ukraine · €31m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.08% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 61%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.08%

€31m

likely from 0.29% toward Russia to 0.37% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €31m (0.08% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€27m of €31m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.09% of GDP more (€34m; likely from 0.30% toward Russia to 0.37% toward Ukraine)
- Cambodia's own gain from trade with Russia: Cambodia kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€3m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 71% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 61%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.29% toward Russia to 0.37% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.08% · €31m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.07% | €27m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €6m |
| Cambodia kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€15m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€15m | −€15m | −0.04% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€11m | −€11m | −0.07% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | −€7m | −€7m | −0.08% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.08% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | +€3m | +€3m | −0.08% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €30m from Russia in 2021 and €30m in 2025 (+2%). It sold €50m to Russia in 2021 and €3m in 2025 (−94%). For Cambodia: €6m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Cambodia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cambodia. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#KHM)

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) | +0.14% · +€20m · likely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| [Thailand](https://warbalance.org/country/thailand/) | +0.08% · +€0.39bn · essentially zero |
| [Vietnam](https://warbalance.org/country/vietnam/) | −0.03% · −€0.10bn · essentially zero |
| Cambodia | −0.08% · −€31m · essentially zero |

## How the number is backed

20 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 29% modelled (C) and 71% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Cambodia kept less from selling to Russia C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

## Questions

### Is Cambodia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.29% toward Russia to 0.37% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 61%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €31m (0.08% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€27m of €31m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is Cambodia's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.29% toward Russia to 0.37% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### How does Cambodia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Thailand +0.08%, Vietnam −0.03%, Cambodia −0.08%.

### Where do the numbers for Cambodia come from?

20 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Cambodia kept less from selling to Russia: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Cambodia have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Cambodia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cambodia.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Uruguay](https://warbalance.org/country/uruguay/) · −0.07% · Essentially zero · −€50m · 63%
- [Pakistan](https://warbalance.org/country/pakistan/) · −0.07% · Essentially zero · −€238m · 70%
- [Uganda](https://warbalance.org/country/uganda/) · −0.07% · Essentially zero · −€33m · 59%
- Cambodia−0.08% · Essentially zero · −€31m · 61%
- [DR Congo](https://warbalance.org/country/dr-congo/) · −0.09% · Essentially zero · −€63m · 64%
- [Bahamas](https://warbalance.org/country/bahamas/) · −0.10% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 68%
- [Gibraltar](https://warbalance.org/country/gibraltar/) · +0.42% · Too close to call · +€15m · 56%

## More about Cambodia

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

20 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#KHM) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/cambodia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/cambodia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/cambodia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/cambodia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/cambodia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/cambodia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cambodia/