# Is Cabo Verde helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call

Cabo Verde's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €4m (0.17% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€13m; the other parts take €9m off it). The net is 0.17% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.98% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Russia).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CPV)

Toward Russia by

0.17% of a year's GDP since 2022

too close to call · 56% toward Russia

likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.98% toward Ukraine · €4m · ≈ 0.04%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.17% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 56%; 90% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

likely from 0.06% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.17%

€4m

likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.99% toward Ukraine too close to call · 55% toward Russia

Russia kept €4m (0.17% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€13m; the other parts take €9m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.17% of GDP more (€4m; likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.99% toward Ukraine)
- Cabo Verde's own gain from trade with Russia: Cabo Verde kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 59% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €13m of the net's €4m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €2.3bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 56%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 33% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.17% · €4m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.54% | €13m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.37% | €9m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€3m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€3m | −€3m | −0.12% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | −€3m | −€3m | −0.25% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | −0.22% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | −0.18% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | −0.17% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €3m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Cabo Verde: €0 paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Cabo Verde's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cabo Verde. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CPV)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €13m (0.54% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

9 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 41% modelled (C) and 59% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Cabo Verde helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.17% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.98% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 56%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €4m (0.17% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€13m; the other parts take €9m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### What decides Cabo Verde's number?

Chance toward Russia: 56%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 33% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Where do the numbers for Cabo Verde come from?

9 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Cabo Verde have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Cabo Verde's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Cabo Verde.

## Nearby in the ranking

Too close to call

- [Anguilla](https://warbalance.org/country/anguilla/) · −0.12% · Too close to call · −€1m · 59%
- [Paraguay](https://warbalance.org/country/paraguay/) · −0.12% · Too close to call · −€50m · 55%
- [Morocco](https://warbalance.org/country/morocco/) · −0.13% · Too close to call · −€182m · 59%
- Cabo Verde−0.17% · Too close to call · −€4m · 56%
- [Sudan](https://warbalance.org/country/sudan/) · −0.21% · Too close to call · −€94m · 54%
- [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) · −0.36% · Too close to call · −€65m · 56%
- [Tajikistan](https://warbalance.org/country/tajikistan/) · −0.40% · Too close to call · −€46m · 58%

## More about Cabo Verde

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

9 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CPV) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/cabo-verde/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/cabo-verde/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/cabo-verde/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/cabo-verde/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/cabo-verde/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/cabo-verde/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cabo-verde/