# Is Brunei helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Brunei's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 3.1% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#BRN)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

3.1% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 85%

likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine · €453m · ≈ 0.66%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 3.1% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

3.1%

€453m

likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 85%

Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.1% of GDP less (€453m; likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine)
- Brunei's own gain from trade with Russia: Brunei kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €542m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 3.1% · €453m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.8% | €261m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +1.5% | €221m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.20% | €29m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.24bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | +€245m | +€245m | +1.7% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | +€219m | +€219m | +3.2% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | +€80m | +€80m | +3.7% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | −€20m | −€20m | +3.6% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | −€71m | −€71m | +3.1% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.49bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.62bn in 2025 (+26%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 99.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Brunei: €221m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Brunei's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €2.9bn | €1.2bnrange €0.80bn to €2.1bn | €2bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €1.2bn | €0.47bnrange €0.35bn to €0.66bn | €0.85bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €8m | – |
| Other goods | €1m | €7m | – | – |
| All goods | €4.1bn | €1.7bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: B, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Brunei's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brunei. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#BRN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €46m extra from 2022 (0.31% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.54bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €29m (0.20% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Brunei | +3.1% · +€0.45bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| [Malaysia](https://warbalance.org/country/malaysia/) | −0.64% · −€2.5bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Turkmenistan](https://warbalance.org/country/turkmenistan/) | +1.5% · +€0.57bn · likely toward Ukraine · 83% |
| [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) | +0.14% · +€20m · likely toward Ukraine · 89% |

## How the number is backed

11 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 94% modelled (C) and 6% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

## Questions

### Does Brunei trade with Russia?

It bought €0.62bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.49bn in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Is Brunei helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +3.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 8.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%). Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €453m (3.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How does Brunei compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Brunei +3.1%, Malaysia −0.64%.

### Where do the numbers for Brunei come from?

11 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Brunei have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Brunei's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brunei.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

31. [Japan](https://warbalance.org/country/japan/) · +0.30% · Toward Ukraine · +€12.2bn
32. [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) · +0.04% · Toward Ukraine · +€107m
- [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) · +3.3% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€3.1bn · 95%
- Brunei+3.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€453m · 85%
- [Lebanon](https://warbalance.org/country/lebanon/) · +2.8% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€578m · 84%
- [Turkmenistan](https://warbalance.org/country/turkmenistan/) · +1.5% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€574m · 83%
- [Greenland](https://warbalance.org/country/greenland/) · +1.5% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€46m · 67%

## More about Brunei

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

11 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#BRN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/brunei/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/brunei/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/brunei/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/brunei/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/brunei/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/brunei/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/