# Does Brazil support Russia? What the money flows show

Brazil's support for Ukraine since 2022: €30m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.51% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#BRA)

Toward Russia by

0.51% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia · €10.1bn · ≈ 0.11%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.51% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€30m

likely <0.01% to 0.01% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.51%

€10.1bn

likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.51% of GDP more (€10.0bn; likely 0.28% to 0.70% toward Russia)
- Brazil's own gain from trade with Russia: Brazil kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€138m; likely <0.01% to 0.03% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €2.1bn (0.10% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Bought 69% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €4.8bn in 2021, €8.0bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €7.6bn of the net's €10.1bn.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €30m

| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €32m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €1m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.51% · €10.1bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.39% | €7.6bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.10% | €2.1bn |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.01% | €292m |
| Brazil earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −<0.01% | €121m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €37m |
| Brazil kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €22m |
| Brazil kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €6m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€3.1bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€3m | −€601m | −€598m | −0.03% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€9m | −€2.8bn | −€2.7bn | −0.17% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€11m | −€3.1bn | −€3.1bn | −0.33% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€2m | −€1.7bn | −€1.7bn | −0.42% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€5m | −€1.9bn | −€1.9bn | −0.51% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Brazil's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €32mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €32m |
| Refugee hosting | €1m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€3m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €30m |

Quality of the split: C No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €4.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €8bn in 2025 (+69%). It sold €1.3bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.4bn in 2025 (+3%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 15.6% of what it bought from Russia. For Brazil: €2.1bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Brazil's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.51bn | €0.35bnrange €0.29bn to €0.43bn | €90m | A |
| Oil products | €21.9bn | €18.7bnrange €15.8bn to €21.8bn | €23bn | A |
| LNG | €35m | €32mrange €26m to €38m | €35m | A |
| Coal | €1.1bn | €1bnrange €0.85bn to €1.2bn | €0.68bn | A |
| Other goods | €22.6bn | €20.2bn | – | – |
| All goods | €46.1bn | €40.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. Brazil has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (April 2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brazil. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Reuters, April 2023: Brazil has not joined sanctions (news report)](https://koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/04/501\_349394.html) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#BRA)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.35bn extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.72bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

1,669 refugees from Ukraine, 0.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Brazil: €1m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 20 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 3 of 6 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bolivia](https://warbalance.org/country/bolivia/) | +0.44% · +€0.22bn · likely toward Ukraine · 82% |
| [Suriname](https://warbalance.org/country/suriname/) | +0.21% · +€8m · likely toward Ukraine · 86% |
| [Colombia](https://warbalance.org/country/colombia/) | +0.15% · +€0.52bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| [Peru](https://warbalance.org/country/peru/) | +0.07% · +€0.19bn · essentially zero |
| [Argentina](https://warbalance.org/country/argentina/) | +0.05% · +€0.31bn · essentially zero |
| [Guyana](https://warbalance.org/country/guyana/) | −<0.01% · −<€1m · essentially zero |
| [Uruguay](https://warbalance.org/country/uruguay/) | −0.07% · −€50m · essentially zero |
| [Venezuela](https://warbalance.org/country/venezuela/) | −0.11% · −€0.11bn · near zero · 71% toward Russia |
| [Paraguay](https://warbalance.org/country/paraguay/) | −0.12% · −€50m · too close to call · 55% toward Russia |
| Brazil | −0.51% · −€10.1bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Jamaica](https://warbalance.org/country/jamaica/) | −0.49% · −€94m · very likely · >99% |
| [Barbados](https://warbalance.org/country/barbados/) | −0.09% · −€6m · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

27 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 96% modelled (C) and 4% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Brazil earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Russia kept more from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

## Questions

### Does Brazil support Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Brazil trade with Russia?

It bought €8bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.8bn in 2021), and sold €1.4bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €10.1bn (0.51% of GDP) more than without the war.

### Brazil–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €8bn from Russia in 2025 (€4.8bn in 2021), and sold €1.4bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €30m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.29% to 0.71% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### How much has Brazil given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €30m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### How does Brazil compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bolivia +0.44%, Suriname +0.21%, Colombia +0.15%, Peru +0.07%, Argentina +0.05%, Guyana −<0.01%, Uruguay −0.07%, Venezuela −0.11%, Paraguay −0.12%, Brazil −0.51%. In the map's ranking: number 20 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Brazil come from?

27 sources back its parts, 8 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Brazil have sanctions on Russia?

No. Brazil has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (April 2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Brazil. Sources: [Reuters, April 2023: Brazil has not joined sanctions (news report)](https://koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/04/501\_349394.html) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 20 of 32

- [Comoros](https://warbalance.org/country/comoros/) · −0.48% · Toward Russia · −€7m
22. [Jamaica](https://warbalance.org/country/jamaica/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€94m
21. [South Africa](https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€1.8bn
20. Brazil−0.51% · Toward Russia · −€10.1bn
19. [Malaysia](https://warbalance.org/country/malaysia/) · −0.64% · Toward Russia · −€2.5bn
- [Niue](https://warbalance.org/country/niue/) · −0.67% · Toward Russia · −<€1m
18. [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) · −0.71% · Toward Russia · −€525m

## More about Brazil

### Groups

- [BRICS](https://warbalance.org/group/brics/)

### Compared with

- [Brazil vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/brazil-vs-china/)
- [Brazil vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/brazil-vs-india/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

27 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#BRA) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/brazil/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/brazil/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/brazil/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/brazil/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/brazil/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/brazil/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/brazil/