# Does Bosnia and Herzegovina support Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Bosnia and Herzegovina has given Ukraine €2m since 2022 (<0.01% of GDP).

Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.56% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#BIH)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.56% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 85%

likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine · €142m · ≈ 0.12%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.56% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself.

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€2m

likely from 0.07% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.55%

€140m

likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 85%

Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.55% of GDP less (€140m; likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina's own gain from trade with Russia: Bosnia and Herzegovina kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Cut through sanctions it adopted Of the €230m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 73% was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 27% went beyond them.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €31m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €229m of the net's €142m.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 62% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €2m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €5m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −0.01% | €3m |

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.55% · €140m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.90% | €229m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.33% | €84m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €5m |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€49m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | −€51m | −€49m | −0.19% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | +€47m | +€47m | −<0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€40m | +€39m | +0.15% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | +€32m | +€32m | +0.27% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€1m | +€72m | +€73m | +0.56% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Bosnia and Herzegovina's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | €5m |
| Money flowing back | −€4msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €2m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.31bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.14bn in 2025 (−53%). It sold €54m to Russia in 2021 and €54m in 2025 (+0%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 50.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Bosnia and Herzegovina: €5m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Bosnia and Herzegovina's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pipeline gas | €0.35bn | €0.33bnrange €0.27bn to €0.45bn | not tracked | A |
| Coal | €75m | €71mrange €53m to €94m | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €0.48bn | €0.56bn | – | – |
| All goods | €0.91bn | €0.97bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 73% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 27% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Bosnia and Herzegovina. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/)
- [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#BIH)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €13m extra from 2022 (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €31m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.12bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Bosnia and Herzegovina; what its firms kept of it, €4m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €84m (0.33% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Croatia](https://warbalance.org/country/croatia/) | +1.5% · +€1.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | +0.56% · +€0.14bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| [Montenegro](https://warbalance.org/country/montenegro/) | +0.37% · +€25m · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) | −1.4% · −€1.1bn · likely toward Russia · 84% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Montenegro](https://warbalance.org/country/montenegro/) | +0.37% · +€25m · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) | +1.1% · +€0.11bn · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |

## How the number is backed

23 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 74% modelled (C) and 26% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Bosnia and Herzegovina kept part of others' aid, spent here C

- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### What decides Bosnia and Herzegovina's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 62% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Does Bosnia and Herzegovina trade with Russia?

It bought €0.14bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.31bn in 2021), and sold €54m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Is Bosnia and Herzegovina helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.56% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.39% toward Russia to 3.9% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%). Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €140m (0.55% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Did Bosnia and Herzegovina cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 73% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 27% beyond what sanctions required.

### How much has Bosnia and Herzegovina given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €2m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### How does Bosnia and Herzegovina compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Croatia +1.5%, Bosnia and Herzegovina +0.56%, Montenegro +0.37%, Serbia −1.4%.

### Does Bosnia and Herzegovina have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sources: [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/); [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Cameroon](https://warbalance.org/country/cameroon/) · +0.99% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€452m · 94%
- [Slovenia](https://warbalance.org/country/slovenia/) · +0.66% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€417m · 88%
- [Liberia](https://warbalance.org/country/liberia/) · +0.63% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€26m · 85%
- Bosnia and Herzegovina+0.56% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€142m · 85%
- [Rwanda](https://warbalance.org/country/rwanda/) · +0.55% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€74m · 90%
- [Austria](https://warbalance.org/country/austria/) · +0.45% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€2.1bn · 68%
- [Bolivia](https://warbalance.org/country/bolivia/) · +0.44% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€217m · 82%

## More about Bosnia and Herzegovina

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-in-other-countries/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [Support for Ukraine by country](https://warbalance.org/support-for-ukraine/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

23 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#BIH) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/