# Is Bermuda helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Bermuda's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take €2m off it). The net is <0.01% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.40% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#BMU)

Toward Russia by

<0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.40% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine · <€1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = <0.01% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 53%; 90% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

<0.01%

<€1m

likely from 0.40% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take €2m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept <0.01% of GDP more (€1m; likely from 0.36% toward Russia to 0.24% toward Ukraine)
- Bermuda's own gain from trade with Russia: Bermuda kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.16% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 51% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 53%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.40% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by <0.01% · <€1m

| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.03% | €2m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.03% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | +<€1m | +<€1m | −<0.01% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<0.01% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Bermuda: €0 paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

Bermuda is a territory of United Kingdom. We did not check whether the sanctions of United Kingdom on Russia extend to it. Separately, Russia lists Bermuda as an “unfriendly” state (government order 3216-r, 29 October 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Bermuda. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Government of Russia, Order of 29 October 2022 No. 3216-r amending the list (scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202210310047)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#BMU)

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

## How the number is backed

9 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 44% modelled (C) and 56% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia more tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Bermuda helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.40% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 53%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept <€1m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2m; the other parts take €2m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is Bermuda's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.40% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Its firms paid Russia more tax.

### Where do the numbers for Bermuda come from?

9 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from services sold here: [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Its firms paid Russia more tax: [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Bermuda have sanctions on Russia?

Bermuda is a territory of United Kingdom. We did not check whether the sanctions of United Kingdom on Russia extend to it. Separately, Russia lists Bermuda as an “unfriendly” state (government order 3216-r, 29 October 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Bermuda. Sources: [Government of Russia, Order of 29 October 2022 No. 3216-r amending the list (scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202210310047).

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Kuwait](https://warbalance.org/country/kuwait/) · +<0.01% · Essentially zero · +€1m · 51%
- [Israel](https://warbalance.org/country/israel/) · +<0.01% · Essentially zero · +€1m · 50%
- [Guyana](https://warbalance.org/country/guyana/) · −<0.01% · Essentially zero · −<€1m · 68%
- Bermuda−<0.01% · Essentially zero · −<€1m · 53%
- [Niger](https://warbalance.org/country/niger/) · −<0.01% · Essentially zero · −€2m · 58%
- [Bangladesh](https://warbalance.org/country/bangladesh/) · −0.01% · Essentially zero · −€61m · 55%
- [Nicaragua](https://warbalance.org/country/nicaragua/) · −0.01% · Essentially zero · −€2m · 50%

## More about Bermuda

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

9 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#BMU) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/bermuda/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/bermuda/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/bermuda/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/bermuda/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/bermuda/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/bermuda/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/bermuda/