# Is Belize helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is near zero

Belize's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €4m (0.13% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m; the other parts take €1m off it). The net is 0.13% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine; near zero · 82% toward Russia).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#BLZ)

Toward Russia by

0.13% of a year's GDP since 2022

near zero · 82% toward Russia

likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine · €4m · ≈ 0.03%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.13% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 82%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.13%

€4m

likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine near zero · 83% toward Russia

Russia kept €4m (0.13% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m; the other parts take €1m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.13% of GDP more (€4m; likely from 0.28% toward Russia to 0.04% toward Ukraine)
- Belize's own gain from trade with Russia: Belize kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.16% toward Russia to 0.19% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 80% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €5m of the net's €4m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €2.8bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 82%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Belize kept more from services sold to Russia. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.13% · €4m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.16% | €5m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.03% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€1m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.03% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.07% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.10% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.11% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.13% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. For Belize: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Belize's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Belize. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#BLZ)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €5m (0.16% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

7 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 5 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 18% modelled (C) and 82% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)

## Questions

### Is Belize helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.13% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine; near zero · 82% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 82%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €4m (0.13% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m; the other parts take €1m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is Belize's net so small?

Its net is near zero: −0.13% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Belize kept more from services sold to Russia.

### Where do the numbers for Belize come from?

7 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from services sold here: [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Belize have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Belize's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Belize.

## Nearby in the ranking

Near zero

- [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) · +0.14% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€20m · 89%
- [Dominican Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/dominican-republic/) · +0.13% · Near zero · +€147m · 86%
- [Venezuela](https://warbalance.org/country/venezuela/) · −0.11% · Near zero · −€109m · 71%
- Belize−0.13% · Near zero · −€4m · 82%
- [Taiwan](https://warbalance.org/country/taiwan/) · +0.09% · Essentially zero · +€659m · 64%
- [Palestine](https://warbalance.org/country/palestine/) · +0.09% · Essentially zero · +€15m · 57%
- [Gabon](https://warbalance.org/country/gabon/) · +0.08% · Essentially zero · +€16m · 74%

## More about Belize

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

7 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#BLZ) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/belize/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/belize/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/belize/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/belize/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/belize/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/belize/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/belize/