# How much has Belgium given to Ukraine since 2022?

Belgium's support for Ukraine since 2022: €5.8bn (0.97% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €10.8bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 3.4% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 2.2% to 4.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#BEL)

Toward Ukraine by

3.4% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 2.2% to 4.7% toward Ukraine · €20.3bn · ≈ 0.73%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 3.4% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to. Much of the net is Russian money frozen here: the return Russia lost on its reserves and private assets, not a payment.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.97%

€5.8bn

likely 0.75% to 1.4% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.62%

€3.7bn

likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 1.8% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 79%

Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.63% of GDP less (€3.7bn; likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 1.8% toward Ukraine)
- Belgium's own gain from trade with Russia: Belgium kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€26m; likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 1.8% of GDP in returns (€10.8bn).

## Its story in short

- Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €4.8bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 100% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 0% went beyond them.
- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €3.1bn (0.52% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €671m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 60% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €6.5bn in 2021, €2.6bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Major aid giver Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €3.8bn (0.64% of GDP), number 11 of 162 economies for its size.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.97% · €5.8bn

| Hosting refugeesC | +0.34% | €2.0bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of EU aidB | +0.33% | €2.0bn |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +0.29% | €1.7bn |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €126m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €32m |
| Belgium kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €23m |
| Belgium kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Belgium kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC | −<0.01% | €5m |
| Belgium kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −<0.01% | €5m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.62% · €3.7bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.80% | €4.7bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.52% | €3.1bn |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.33% | €1.9bn |
| Belgium's companies made less profit in RussiaC | +0.02% | €98m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +0.01% | €89m |
| Belgium earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.01% | €81m |
| Belgium kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €51m |
| Russian owners kept less from their firms hereC | +<0.01% | €31m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €11m |
| Belgium kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €7m |
| Belgium kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 1.8% in returns · €10.8bn

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +1.2% | €7.4bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +0.57% | €3.4bn |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€6.3bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €0.90bn in 2022 to €1.3bn in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€901m | −€2.0bn | +€752m | −€384m | −0.06% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€1.3bn | +€1.4bn | +€3.4bn | +€6.1bn | +0.96% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€1.5bn | +€1.8bn | +€3.0bn | +€6.3bn | +2.0% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€1.3bn | +€870m | +€2.3bn | +€4.4bn | +2.8% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€818m | +€1.6bn | +€1.4bn | +€3.8bn | +3.4% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Belgium's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €1.2bnrange €0.63bn to €2.4bn; Kiel: €2.8bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €81mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €32m |
| Humanitarian aid | €0.41bn |
| Refugee hosting | €2bn |
| Share of EU aid | €2bnof which military: €10m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.12bn |
| Money flowing back | −€41msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €5.8bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €6.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.6bn in 2025 (−60%). It sold €3.4bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.2bn in 2025 (−35%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 49.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Belgium: €3.1bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 69% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Belgium's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €4m | €3mrange €3m to €4m | not tracked | A |
| Oil products | €6.3bn | €5.1bnrange €3.9bn to €6.8bn | €7.6bn | A |
| Pipeline gas | €0.36bn | €0.30bnrange €0.23bn to €0.40bn | €13m | A |
| LNG | €8.4bn | €7.6bnrange €5.2bn to €10.5bn | €12.9bn | A |
| Coal | €0.52bn | €0.42bnrange €0.33bn to €0.56bn | €0.25bn | A |
| Other goods | €7.4bn | €7bn | – | – |
| All goods | €23bn | €20.4bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 100% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 0% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. As an EU member, Belgium applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Belgium as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Belgium. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#BEL)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €1.3bn extra from 2022 (0.22% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.67bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: 1.8% of a year's GDP (€10.8bn; likely €7.9bn to €12.1bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €185bn (December 2025, [source](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/09/26/brussels-pitches-140-billion-loan-to-ukraine-based-on-russias-frozen-assets) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €10bn (February 2025, [source](https://occrp.org/en/scoop/belgium-blocked-270b-due-to-russian-sanctions-much-of-it-belongs-to-unsanctioned-russians)); €55bn of Russian investors' securities blocked through the sanctioned depository NSD, counted apart (February 2025). Euroclear reports €202bn of sanctioned Russian assets on its balance sheet (June 2026); that figure overlaps the central bank's and is not added to it.

## Refugees from Ukraine

95,640 refugees from Ukraine, 8.1 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €2bn (0.34% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Belgium: €2.0bn spent on refugees, less €29m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €3.3bn; counted here: €1.7bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €2.8bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €1.3bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €5bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €993m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€1.2bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Belgium; what its firms kept of it, €41m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Belgium's companies made less profit in Russia: €98m (0.02% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €89m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €1.1bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €594m to €1.4bn; 0.18% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1.9bn (0.33% of one year's GDP). Belgium kept more from shipping Russian oil: €51m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €21m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €20m to €67m); €68m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 13 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 12 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 11 of 23 members toward Ukraine.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Netherlands](https://warbalance.org/country/netherlands/) | +5.1% · +€54.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Germany](https://warbalance.org/country/germany/) | +3.7% · +€153bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Luxembourg](https://warbalance.org/country/luxembourg/) | +3.5% · +€2.9bn · very likely · >99% |
| Belgium | +3.4% · +€20.3bn · very likely · >99% |
| [France](https://warbalance.org/country/france/) | +1.6% · +€43.6bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Luxembourg](https://warbalance.org/country/luxembourg/) | +3.5% · +€2.9bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Cyprus](https://warbalance.org/country/cyprus/) | +3.6% · +€1.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Germany](https://warbalance.org/country/germany/) | +3.7% · +€153bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Sweden](https://warbalance.org/country/sweden/) | +3.7% · +€20.1bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

44 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 11 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 7% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 71% modelled (C) and 21% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia lost returns on its frozen money C

- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen here D

- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [fuel hubs and flag registries (Eurostat oil balances, UN Comtrade own and partner records, port bunker sales), laundered-oil caps from fuel use, Belgian company tax 2022](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_cb\_oil?format=JSON&siec=O4600&geo=NL&unit=THS\_T&nrg\_bal=IMP&nrg\_bal=EXP&nrg\_bal=INTMARB&nrg\_bal=GID\_OBS&nrg\_bal=TO\_RPI\_RO&nrg\_bal=FC\_E)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- research · [Russian-owned metals, mining and chemicals plants abroad (Rusal, NLMK, Nornickel, EuroChem): company filings and parent reports](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=A&reporter=IE&partner=RU&product=281820&flow=2&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)

## Questions

### How much has Belgium given to Ukraine?

Belgium's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €5.8bn, 0.97% of one year's GDP (likely 0.75% to 1.4%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Belgium trade with Russia?

It bought €2.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€6.5bn in 2021), and sold €2.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Does Belgium help Russia get around sanctions?

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €21m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €20m to €67m); €68m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### Is Belgium helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +3.4% of one year's GDP (likely 2.2% to 4.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Belgium still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 49.7% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €2.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €6.5bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### How much Russian money is frozen in Belgium?

Russian money frozen: 1.8% of a year's GDP (€10.8bn; likely €7.9bn to €12.1bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €185bn (December 2025, [source](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/09/26/brussels-pitches-140-billion-loan-to-ukraine-based-on-russias-frozen-assets) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €10bn (February 2025, [source](https://occrp.org/en/scoop/belgium-blocked-270b-due-to-russian-sanctions-much-of-it-belongs-to-unsanctioned-russians)); €55bn of Russian investors' securities blocked through the sanctioned depository NSD, counted apart (February 2025). Euroclear reports €202bn of sanctioned Russian assets on its balance sheet (June 2026); that figure overlaps the central bank's and is not added to it.

### Does Belgium have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. As an EU member, Belgium applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Belgium as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Belgium. Sources: [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 13 of 32

10. [Germany](https://warbalance.org/country/germany/) · +3.7% · Toward Ukraine · +€153bn
11. [Cyprus](https://warbalance.org/country/cyprus/) · +3.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.2bn
12. [Luxembourg](https://warbalance.org/country/luxembourg/) · +3.5% · Toward Ukraine · +€2.9bn
13. Belgium+3.4% · Toward Ukraine · +€20.3bn
14. [Norway](https://warbalance.org/country/norway/) · +2.9% · Toward Ukraine · +€14.8bn
15. [Romania](https://warbalance.org/country/romania/) · +2.8% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.9bn
16. [Czechia](https://warbalance.org/country/czechia/) · +2.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.0bn

## More about Belgium

### Groups

- [EU countries](https://warbalance.org/group/eu/)
- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Compared with

- [United States vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-belgium/)
- [Germany vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-belgium/)
- [Netherlands vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/netherlands-vs-belgium/)
- [United Kingdom vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-kingdom-vs-belgium/)
- [France vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/france-vs-belgium/)
- [Poland vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/poland-vs-belgium/)
- [Norway vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-belgium/)
- [Italy vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/italy-vs-belgium/)
- [Denmark vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/denmark-vs-belgium/)
- [Sweden vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/sweden-vs-belgium/)
- [Canada vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-belgium/)
- [Spain vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/spain-vs-belgium/)
- [Switzerland vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-belgium/)
- [Ireland vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/ireland-vs-belgium/)
- [Belgium vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/belgium-vs-japan/)
- [Belgium vs Finland](https://warbalance.org/compare/belgium-vs-finland/)
- [Belgium vs Czechia](https://warbalance.org/compare/belgium-vs-czechia/)
- [Belgium vs Austria](https://warbalance.org/compare/belgium-vs-austria/)
- [Belgium vs Romania](https://warbalance.org/compare/belgium-vs-romania/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Frozen Russian private assets](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-private-assets/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Share of EU aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/eu-aid-to-ukraine-by-member/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

44 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#BEL) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/belgium/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/belgium/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/belgium/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/belgium/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/belgium/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/belgium/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/belgium/