# Is the Bahamas helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

The Bahamas' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €13m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€12m of €13m). The net is 0.10% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#BHS)

Toward Russia by

0.10% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine · €13m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.10% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.10%

€13m

likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €13m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€12m of €13m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.09% of GDP more (€12m; likely from 0.45% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine)
- The Bahamas' own gain from trade with Russia: The Bahamas kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €48m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 93% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.10% · €13m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.09% | €12m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The Bahamas kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€11m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | +€10m | +€10m | +0.07% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | −€8m | −€8m | +0.02% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −€11m | −€11m | −0.06% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −€3m | −€3m | −0.08% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −0.10% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €2m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For the Bahamas: €0 paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

The Bahamas' financial regulators told banks on 12 March 2022 not to deal with people and companies sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU and Canada. It has no sanctions list of its own. Separately, Russia lists the Bahamas as an “unfriendly” state (government order 2018-r, 23 July 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Bahamas. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Central Bank of The Bahamas, GFSR directives on Russian business activities, 12 March 2022](https://centralbankbahamas.com/news/press-releases/press-release-group-of-financial-services-regulators-directives-on-russian-business-activities)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 23 July 2022 No. 2018-r amending the list (scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207250018)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#BHS)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.29bn extra from 2022 (2.0% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €48m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

## How the number is backed

8 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 6% modelled (C) and 94% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### The Bahamas kept more from services sold to Russia C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)

## Questions

### Is the Bahamas helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.10% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 68%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €13m (0.10% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€12m of €13m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is the Bahamas' net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.10% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries.

### Where do the numbers for the Bahamas come from?

8 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); The Bahamas kept more from services sold to Russia: [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does the Bahamas have sanctions on Russia?

The Bahamas' financial regulators told banks on 12 March 2022 not to deal with people and companies sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU and Canada. It has no sanctions list of its own. Separately, Russia lists the Bahamas as an “unfriendly” state (government order 2018-r, 23 July 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Bahamas. Sources: [Central Bank of The Bahamas, GFSR directives on Russian business activities, 12 March 2022](https://centralbankbahamas.com/news/press-releases/press-release-group-of-financial-services-regulators-directives-on-russian-business-activities); [Government of Russia, Order of 23 July 2022 No. 2018-r amending the list (scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207250018).

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Uganda](https://warbalance.org/country/uganda/) · −0.07% · Essentially zero · −€33m · 59%
- [Cambodia](https://warbalance.org/country/cambodia/) · −0.08% · Essentially zero · −€31m · 61%
- [DR Congo](https://warbalance.org/country/dr-congo/) · −0.09% · Essentially zero · −€63m · 64%
- Bahamas−0.10% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 68%
- [Gibraltar](https://warbalance.org/country/gibraltar/) · +0.42% · Too close to call · +€15m · 56%
- [Faroe Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/faroe-islands/) · +0.32% · Too close to call · +€11m · 56%
- [Slovakia](https://warbalance.org/country/slovakia/) · +0.24% · Too close to call · +€294m · 58%

## More about Bahamas

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

8 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#BHS) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/bahamas/