# Is Azerbaijan helping Russia? What the money flows show

Azerbaijan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €31m (0.04% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 2.5% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#AZE)

Toward Russia by

2.5% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 99%

likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia · €1.7bn · ≈ 0.53%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.5% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.04%

€31m

likely from 0.13% below zero to 0.10% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

2.5%

€1.8bn

likely 0.86% to 4.1% toward Russia very likely · 99%

Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.4% of GDP more (€1.7bn; likely 0.83% to 3.8% toward Russia)
- Azerbaijan's own gain from trade with Russia: Azerbaijan kept 0.08% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€54m; likely from 0.87% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €270m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 89% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €3.2bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Russian-owned firms here Russian owners kept €425m (0.61% of GDP) more from their firms here.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €1.3bn of the net's €1.7bn.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.04% · €31m

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.06% | €42m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.02% | €14m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €4m |
| Azerbaijan kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.5% · €1.8bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −1.8% | €1.3bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD | −0.61% | €425m |
| Azerbaijan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.06% | €40m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.03% | €21m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €17m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.02% | €17m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €16m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.02% | €11m |
| Azerbaijan's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −0.01% | €8m |
| Azerbaijan kept more from selling to RussiaD | −0.01% | €8m |
| Azerbaijan kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.66bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€14m | −€224m | −€210m | −0.30% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€10m | −€476m | −€466m | −0.96% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€8m | −€665m | −€657m | −1.9% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | −€408m | −€409m | −2.5% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€13m | +€13m | −2.5% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Azerbaijan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Humanitarian aid | €42m |
| Refugee hosting | €4m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€14m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €31m |

Quality of the split: B No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.2bn in 2025 (+89%). It sold €0.73bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.94bn in 2025 (+29%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 17.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Azerbaijan: €16m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2025. Remittances from Russia changed by −0.60% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: −€423m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€1.2bn to +€301m); migrants sent €2.3bn home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Azerbaijan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €2.3bn | €2.2bnrange €1.9bn to €2.5bn | €2bn | A |
| Oil products | €0.94bn | €0.92bnrange €0.78bn to €1.1bn | €31m | C (estimate) |
| Pipeline gas | €0.17bn | €0.17bnrange €0.15bn to €0.19bn | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €10bn | €9.8bn | – | – |
| All goods | €13.4bn | €13.1bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Azerbaijan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Azerbaijan. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#AZE)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.22bn extra from 2022 (0.32% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.27bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

5,043 refugees from Ukraine, 0.5 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €4m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Azerbaijan: €4m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.43bn (0.61% of one year's GDP).

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €17m (0.02% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €10m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €6m to €15m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 9 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 4 of 4 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Armenia](https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/) | −0.17% · −€37m · likely toward Russia · 69% |
| Azerbaijan | −2.5% · −€1.7bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) | −3.1% · −€32.7bn · very likely · 96% |
| [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) | −4.1% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) | −3.1% · −€32.7bn · very likely · 96% |

## How the number is backed

34 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 2% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 70% modelled (C) and 28% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russian owners kept more from their firms here D

- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

### Azerbaijan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### Is Azerbaijan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −2.5% of one year's GDP (likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Azerbaijan trade with Russia?

It bought €3.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.94bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.8bn (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war.

### Azerbaijan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €3.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.94bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €31m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −2.5% of one year's GDP (likely 0.82% to 4.1% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Azerbaijan help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €10m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €6m to €15m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How much has Azerbaijan given to Ukraine?

Azerbaijan's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €31m, 0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.13% below zero to 0.10% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How does Azerbaijan compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Armenia −0.17%, Azerbaijan −2.5%, Türkiye −3.1%, Georgia −4.1%. In the map's ranking: number 9 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Does Azerbaijan have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Azerbaijan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Azerbaijan.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 9 of 32

11. [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) · −1.5% · Toward Russia · −€236m
10. [India](https://warbalance.org/country/india/) · −2.2% · Toward Russia · −€70.6bn
- [Palau](https://warbalance.org/country/palau/) · −2.4% · Toward Russia · −€6m
9. Azerbaijan−2.5% · Toward Russia · −€1.7bn
- [Bhutan](https://warbalance.org/country/bhutan/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€71m
8. [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€974m
- [Tuvalu](https://warbalance.org/country/tuvalu/) · −2.9% · Toward Russia · −€1m

## More about Azerbaijan

### Groups

- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad](https://warbalance.org/russian-owned-companies-abroad/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

34 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#AZE) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/azerbaijan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/azerbaijan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/azerbaijan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/azerbaijan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/azerbaijan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/azerbaijan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/azerbaijan/