# Is Australia helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Australia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €1.3bn (0.08% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.9bn (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2.0bn; the other parts take €111m off it). The net is 0.04% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#AUS)

Toward Russia by

0.04% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine · €607m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.04% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 76%; 91% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.08%

€1.3bn

likely 0.06% to 0.13% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.12%

€1.9bn

likely 0.07% to 0.17% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Russia kept €1.9bn (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2.0bn; the other parts take €111m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.12% of GDP more (€1.9bn; likely 0.07% to 0.17% toward Russia)
- Australia's own gain from trade with Russia: Australia kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€15m; likely from 0.01% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€15m).

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 76%; 91% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.08% · €1.3bn

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.05% | €841m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €329m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €138m |
| Australia kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €29m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €23m |
| Australia kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Australia kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Australia kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Australia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.12% · €1.9bn

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.13% | €2.0bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +<0.01% | €143m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €69m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €18m |
| Australia's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €13m |
| Australia kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Australia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €3m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €15m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD | +<0.01% | €8m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereC | +<0.01% | €7m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.36bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.51bn in 2022 to €97m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€513m | −€157m | +€2m | +€357m | +0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€201m | −€162m | +€4m | +€42m | +0.02% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€383m | −€518m | +€4m | −€131m | +0.02% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€97m | −€363m | +€4m | −€262m | +<0.01% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€93m | −€709m | +€2m | −€614m | −0.04% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Australia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0.68bnrange €0.48bn to €0.88bn; Kiel: €0.91bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €23mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €23m |
| Humanitarian aid | €0.16bn |
| Refugee hosting | €0.14bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.33bn |
| Money flowing back | −€40msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €1.3bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.30bn from Russia in 2021 and €16m in 2025 (−95%). It sold €0.16bn to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025 (−97%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 25.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Australia: €69m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Australia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.24bn | €0.20bnrange €0.17bn to €0.25bn | €0.17bn | A |
| Coal | €5m | €5mrange €4m to €6m | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €1.4bn | €0.32bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.6bn | €0.53bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Australia has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Australia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Australia. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (F2011L02673), reg. 5B 'Sanctioned commercial activity—Russia'](https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2011L02673/latest/text)
- [DFAT, Russia sanctions regime (page not retrievable on the date checked)](https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/russia-sanctions-regime)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#AUS)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €12m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€15m; likely €6m to €89m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: no public figure.

## Refugees from Ukraine

5,473 refugees from Ukraine, 0.2 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.14bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Australia: €160m spent on refugees, less €22m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €1.1bn; counted here: €841m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €41m. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €11m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.36bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Australia; what its firms kept of it, €40m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €121m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €37m to €381m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €2bn (0.13% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

## How the number is backed

35 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 23% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 63% modelled (C) and 14% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries C

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)

### Private donations D

- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)

### Hosting refugees D

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### Is Australia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 76%; 91% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.9bn (0.12% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€2.0bn; the other parts take €111m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Australia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €16m from Russia in 2025 (€0.30bn in 2021), and sold €4m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €1.3bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### How much has Australia given to Ukraine?

Australia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1.3bn, 0.08% of one year's GDP (likely 0.06% to 0.13%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How much did Australia give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.51bn; 2023 €0.20bn; 2024 €0.38bn; 2025 €97m; 2026 (to August) €93m. In total since 2022: €1.3bn (likely 0.06% to 0.13%).

### Why is Australia's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.04% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries.

### Why does War Balance differ from the Kiel tracker for Australia?

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €1.1bn; counted here: €841m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.

### Does Australia have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Australia has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Australia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Australia. Sources: [Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (F2011L02673), reg. 5B 'Sanctioned commercial activity—Russia'](https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2011L02673/latest/text); [DFAT, Russia sanctions regime (page not retrievable on the date checked)](https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/russia-sanctions-regime).

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Malawi](https://warbalance.org/country/malawi/) · −0.02% · Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- [Vietnam](https://warbalance.org/country/vietnam/) · −0.03% · Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
- [Curaçao](https://warbalance.org/country/curacao/) · −0.03% · Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%
- Australia−0.04% · Essentially zero · −€607m · 76%
- [Zimbabwe](https://warbalance.org/country/zimbabwe/) · −0.05% · Essentially zero · −€17m · 55%
- [Zambia](https://warbalance.org/country/zambia/) · −0.05% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 57%
- [Myanmar](https://warbalance.org/country/myanmar/) · −0.05% · Essentially zero · −€35m · 65%

## More about Australia

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Refugee spending kept in the host economy](https://warbalance.org/refugee-spending-in-host-economies/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Frozen Russian private assets](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-private-assets/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

35 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#AUS) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/australia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/australia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/australia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/australia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/australia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/australia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/australia/