# Is Armenia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Armenia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)). The net is 0.17% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 69%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#ARM)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.17% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 69%

likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine · €37m · ≈ 0.04%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.17% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.02%

€3m

likely from 0.21% below zero to 0.05% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.15%

€34m

likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 69%

Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.62% of GDP less (€133m; likely from 7.6% toward Russia to 5.9% toward Ukraine)
- Armenia's own gain from trade with Russia: Armenia kept 0.77% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€167m; likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €86m (0.40% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €364m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Sold Russia 113% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €606m in 2021, €1.3bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €177m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €177m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €19m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Russian-owned firms here Russian owners kept €152m (0.70% of GDP) more from their firms here.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 12% larger, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €3m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.02% | €4m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Armenia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.15% · €34m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.5% | €318m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD | −0.70% | €152m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.40% | €86m |
| Armenia kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −0.32% | €68m |
| Armenia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.30% | €64m |
| Armenia kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.23% | €51m |
| Armenia's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +0.09% | €19m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.09% | €19m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.09% | €19m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +0.08% | €17m |
| Armenia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −0.02% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.16bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€1m | −€158m | −€159m | −0.74% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | +€9m | +€8m | −0.70% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€1m | +€68m | +€67m | −0.39% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | +€10m | +€9m | −0.34% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | +€37m | +€38m | −0.17% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Armenia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Refugee hosting | €2m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€4m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€3m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €2bn in 2025 (+41%). It sold €0.61bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (+113%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 37.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Armenia: €86m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +1.6% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€355m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€946m to +€1.8bn); migrants sent €3.9bn home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Armenia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €1.2bn | €1.1bnrange €0.94bn to €1.4bn | not tracked | B |
| Pipeline gas | €1.7bn | €1.6bnrange €1.4bn to €1.9bn | not tracked | B |
| Other goods | €17.7bn | €6.6bn | – | – |
| All goods | €20.6bn | €9.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Armenia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Armenia. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#ARM)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.36bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

4,830 refugees from Ukraine, 1.6 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Armenia: €2m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.15bn (0.70% of one year's GDP).

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Armenia kept more from settling Russia's trade: €68m (0.32% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €177m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €158m to €353m); €4m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Armenia | −0.17% · −€37m · likely toward Russia · 69% |
| [Azerbaijan](https://warbalance.org/country/azerbaijan/) | −2.5% · −€1.7bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) | −3.1% · −€32.7bn · very likely · 96% |
| [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) | −4.1% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) | −1.4% · −€1.1bn · likely toward Russia · 84% |
| [North Macedonia](https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/) | −2.1% · −€0.30bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |
| [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) | −4.1% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

## How the number is backed

35 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 58% modelled (C) and 42% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [EAEU members' own statistics of trade with Russia: Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Armstat; EEC member-pair tables 2015-2021](https://stat.gov.kg/ru/publications/vzaimnaya-torgovlya-tovarami-kyrgyzskoj-respubliki-s-gosudarstvami-chlenami-evrazijskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soyuza/)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Russian owners kept more from their firms here D

- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Armenia kept more from settling Russia's trade D

- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)

### Armenia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [EAEU members' own statistics of trade with Russia: Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Armstat; EEC member-pair tables 2015-2021](https://stat.gov.kg/ru/publications/vzaimnaya-torgovlya-tovarami-kyrgyzskoj-respubliki-s-gosudarstvami-chlenami-evrazijskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soyuza/)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### Is Armenia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.17% of one year's GDP (likely from 8.9% toward Russia to 5.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 69%). Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Armenia help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €177m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €158m to €353m); €4m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### Does Armenia trade with Russia?

It bought €2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €1.3bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Armenia moved €34m (0.15% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Armenia kept more from selling to Russia, mostly profits sent to Russian owners (€152m; the other parts take €119m off it)).

### What decides Armenia's number?

Chance toward Russia: 69%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 12% larger, the direction would flip.

### Does Armenia still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 37.4% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €2bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €1.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### How does Armenia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Armenia −0.17%, Azerbaijan −2.5%, Türkiye −3.1%, Georgia −4.1%.

### Does Armenia have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Armenia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Armenia.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Saint Kitts and Nevis](https://warbalance.org/country/saint-kitts-and-nevis/) · −0.55% · Too close to call · −€5m · 61%
- [Syria](https://warbalance.org/country/syria/) · −1.0% · Too close to call · −€200m · 64%
- [Mauritania](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritania/) · −0.12% · Leaning toward Russia · −€12m · 68%
- Armenia−0.17% · Leaning toward Russia · −€37m · 69%
- [Seychelles](https://warbalance.org/country/seychelles/) · −0.22% · Leaning toward Russia · −€4m · 80%
- [Antigua and Barbuda](https://warbalance.org/country/antigua-and-barbuda/) · −0.28% · Leaning toward Russia · −€5m · 89%
- [Sao Tome and Principe](https://warbalance.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe/) · −0.29% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 71%

## More about Armenia

### Groups

- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad](https://warbalance.org/russian-owned-companies-abroad/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

35 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#ARM) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/armenia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/armenia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/armenia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/armenia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/armenia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/armenia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/