# Is Argentina helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Argentina's support for Ukraine since 2022: €11m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €300m (0.05% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.05% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#ARG)

Toward Ukraine by

0.05% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine · €311m · ≈ 0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.05% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 94%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€11m

likely <0.01% to 0.01% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.05%

€300m

likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €300m (0.05% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.05% of GDP less (€294m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.20% toward Ukraine)
- Argentina's own gain from trade with Russia: Argentina kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€5m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 94%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €11m

| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €10m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.05% · €300m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.06% | €364m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.01% | €78m |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +<0.01% | €8m |
| Argentina kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €7m |
| Argentina kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.14bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | +€143m | +€145m | +0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€3m | +€81m | +€84m | +0.04% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€4m | +€34m | +€37m | +0.04% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€1m | +€17m | +€18m | +0.05% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€2m | +€25m | +€27m | +0.05% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Argentina's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €10mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €10m |
| Private donations and purchases | €1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €11m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.51bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.29bn in 2025 (−43%). It sold €0.57bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.45bn in 2025 (−22%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 23.1% of what it bought from Russia. For Argentina: €8m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Argentina's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.18bn | €0.15bnrange €0.11bn to €0.20bn | €0.25bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €6m | – |
| Other goods | €0.91bn | €0.80bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.1bn | €0.96bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Argentina's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Argentina. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#ARG)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €13m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bolivia](https://warbalance.org/country/bolivia/) | +0.44% · +€0.22bn · likely toward Ukraine · 82% |
| Argentina | +0.05% · +€0.31bn · essentially zero |
| [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) | +0.04% · +€0.11bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Uruguay](https://warbalance.org/country/uruguay/) | −0.07% · −€50m · essentially zero |
| [Paraguay](https://warbalance.org/country/paraguay/) | −0.12% · −€50m · too close to call · 55% toward Russia |
| [Brazil](https://warbalance.org/country/brazil/) | −0.51% · −€10.1bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

23 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 83% modelled (C) and 17% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C

- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Argentina kept less from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Argentina helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 94%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €300m (0.05% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much has Argentina given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €11m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### Does Argentina trade with Russia?

It bought €0.29bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.51bn in 2021), and sold €0.45bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €300m (0.05% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Why is Argentina's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.21% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### How does Argentina compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bolivia +0.44%, Argentina +0.05%, Chile +0.04%, Uruguay −0.07%, Paraguay −0.12%, Brazil −0.51%.

### Where do the numbers for Argentina come from?

23 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Its share of IMF and World Bank loans: [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Argentina have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Argentina's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Argentina.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Mali](https://warbalance.org/country/mali/) · +0.06% · Essentially zero · +€14m · 57%
- [Costa Rica](https://warbalance.org/country/costa-rica/) · +0.06% · Essentially zero · +€45m · 69%
- [New Zealand](https://warbalance.org/country/new-zealand/) · +0.05% · Essentially zero · +€126m · 95%
- Argentina+0.05% · Essentially zero · +€311m · 94%
- [Philippines](https://warbalance.org/country/philippines/) · +0.04% · Essentially zero · +€175m · 75%
- [El Salvador](https://warbalance.org/country/el-salvador/) · +0.04% · Essentially zero · +€11m · 58%
- [Mexico](https://warbalance.org/country/mexico/) · +0.03% · Essentially zero · +€405m · 88%

## More about Argentina

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

23 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#ARG) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/argentina/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/argentina/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/argentina/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/argentina/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/argentina/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/argentina/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/argentina/