# Is Antigua and Barbuda helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Antigua and Barbuda's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €5m (0.28% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m of €5m). The net is 0.28% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.80% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 89%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#ATG)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.28% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 89%

likely from 0.80% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine · €5m · ≈ 0.06%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.28% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.28%

€5m

likely from 0.80% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 89%

Russia kept €5m (0.28% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m of €5m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.28% of GDP more (€5m; likely from 0.79% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine)
- Antigua and Barbuda's own gain from trade with Russia: Antigua and Barbuda kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.07% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 96% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €5m of the net's €5m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €1.9bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.28% · €5m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.27% | €5m |
| --- | --- | --- |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€2m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.10% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | −€2m | −€2m | −0.18% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.22% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.28% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Antigua and Barbuda's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Antigua and Barbuda. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#ATG)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €5m (0.27% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

3 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 2 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)

## Questions

### Is Antigua and Barbuda helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.28% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.80% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 89%). Chance toward Russia: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €5m (0.28% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€5m of €5m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for Antigua and Barbuda come from?

3 sources back its parts, 0 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Antigua and Barbuda have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Antigua and Barbuda's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Antigua and Barbuda.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Mauritania](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritania/) · −0.12% · Leaning toward Russia · −€12m · 68%
- [Armenia](https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/) · −0.17% · Leaning toward Russia · −€37m · 69%
- [Seychelles](https://warbalance.org/country/seychelles/) · −0.22% · Leaning toward Russia · −€4m · 80%
- Antigua and Barbuda−0.28% · Leaning toward Russia · −€5m · 89%
- [Sao Tome and Principe](https://warbalance.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe/) · −0.29% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 71%
- [Kenya](https://warbalance.org/country/kenya/) · −0.31% · Leaning toward Russia · −€333m · 90%
- [Eritrea](https://warbalance.org/country/eritrea/) · −0.32% · Leaning toward Russia · −€7m · 68%

## More about Antigua and Barbuda

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

3 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#ATG) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/antigua-and-barbuda/