# Is Algeria helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Algeria's support for Ukraine since 2022: €38m (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€637m; the other parts take €634m off it). The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.93% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#DZA)

Toward Ukraine by

0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.93% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine · €36m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly war-time fuel prices.

Chance toward Russia: 57%; 10% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.02%

€38m

likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.04% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

<0.01%

€3m

likely from 0.95% toward Russia to 0.73% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €3m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€637m; the other parts take €634m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept <0.01% of GDP more (€2m; likely from 0.95% toward Russia to 0.73% toward Ukraine)
- Algeria's own gain from trade with Russia: Algeria kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €637m (0.28% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 57%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.93% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €38m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.01% | €34m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Algeria kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by <0.01% · €3m

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.28% | €637m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.23% | €535m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.04% | €103m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Algeria kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€99m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | −€101m | −€99m | −0.04% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€3m | −€90m | −€93m | −0.08% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€6m | +€52m | +€58m | −0.06% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€23m | +€23m | +€47m | −0.04% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€10m | +€112m | +€123m | +0.02% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Algeria's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €5mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €5m |
| Private donations and purchases | €35m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €38m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €2.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.9bn in 2025 (−32%). It sold €12m to Russia in 2021 and €15m in 2025 (+31%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 6.0% of what it bought from Russia. For Algeria: €637m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023, 23% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Algeria's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0m | €0m | €2m | – |
| Oil products | €0.11bn | €92mrange €54m to €0.16bn | €77m | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €51m | €47mrange €27m to €82m | €49m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0m | €9.3bn | – | – |
| All goods | €0.16bn | €9.4bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Algeria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Algeria. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#DZA)

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€79m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Algeria; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Mali](https://warbalance.org/country/mali/) | +0.06% · +€14m · essentially zero |
| Algeria | +0.02% · +€36m · essentially zero |
| [Niger](https://warbalance.org/country/niger/) | −<0.01% · −€2m · essentially zero |
| [Mauritania](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritania/) | −0.12% · −€12m · likely toward Russia · 68% |
| [Morocco](https://warbalance.org/country/morocco/) | −0.13% · −€0.18bn · too close to call · 59% toward Russia |
| [Tunisia](https://warbalance.org/country/tunisia/) | −4.6% · −€2.1bn · very likely · 98% |
| [Libya](https://warbalance.org/country/libya/) | −6.6% · −€2.8bn · very likely · 99% |

## How the number is backed

20 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)

### Russia kept less from weapons sold here D

- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)

### Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)

## Questions

### Is Algeria helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.93% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 57%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€637m; the other parts take €634m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is Algeria's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.93% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices.

### How much has Algeria given to Ukraine?

Algeria's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €38m, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.04% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How does Algeria compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Mali +0.06%, Algeria +0.02%, Niger −<0.01%, Mauritania −0.12%, Morocco −0.13%, Tunisia −4.6%, Libya −6.6%.

### Does Algeria trade with Russia?

It bought €1.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€2.8bn in 2021), and sold €15m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3m (<0.01% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€637m; the other parts take €634m off it).

### Where do the numbers for Algeria come from?

20 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less from weapons sold here: [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Algeria have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Algeria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Algeria.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Mexico](https://warbalance.org/country/mexico/) · +0.03% · Essentially zero · +€405m · 88%
- [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/) · +0.02% · Essentially zero · +€55m · 60%
- [Guatemala](https://warbalance.org/country/guatemala/) · +0.02% · Essentially zero · +€18m · 71%
- Algeria+0.02% · Essentially zero · +€36m · 57%
- [Eswatini](https://warbalance.org/country/eswatini/) · +0.01% · Essentially zero · +€1m · 66%
- [Madagascar](https://warbalance.org/country/madagascar/) · +0.01% · Essentially zero · +€2m · 59%
- [Lesotho](https://warbalance.org/country/lesotho/) · +0.01% · Essentially zero · +<€1m · 80%

## More about Algeria

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Extra sales to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/sales-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

20 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#DZA) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/algeria/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/algeria/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/algeria/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/algeria/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/algeria/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/algeria/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/algeria/