# Israel vs Türkiye: support for Ukraine and trade with Russia since 2022

Israel: Toward Ukraine by <0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Türkiye: Toward Russia by 3.1% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%).

Support for Ukraine in euros: Israel €0.14bn, Türkiye €0.16bn. More in euros: Türkiye; more as a share of GDP: Israel.

[Israel →](https://warbalance.org/#ISR) [Türkiye →](https://warbalance.org/#TUR)

These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.

## Side by side

| # | Country | Net | Support for Ukraine | Russia kept from trade, vs no war | Paid Russia since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| – | [Israel](https://warbalance.org/country/israel/) | <0.01% · +€1m · <€1 per personlikely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraineessentially zero | +€0.14bn · +0.03% of GDPessentially zero | €0.14bn more · 0.03% of GDP moreessentially zero | €5.3bn · 1.1% of GDP |
| – | [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) | −3.1% · −€32.7bn · −€382 per personlikely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russiavery likely · 96% | +€0.16bn · +0.02% of GDPessentially zero | €32.8bn more · 3.1% of GDP morevery likely · 96% | €174bn · 16.3% of GDP |

Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.

## What makes up each number

| Measure | Israel | Türkiye |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Private donations to Ukraine | +€0.10bn · +0.02% of GDP | – |
| Cost of hosting refugees from Ukraine | +€12m · <0.01% of GDP | +€6m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Government aid to Ukraine | +€12m · <0.01% of GDP | +€54m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Purchases from Ukraine vs no war | +€10m · <0.01% of GDP | +€0.16bn · +0.01% of GDP |
| Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine | +€8m · <0.01% of GDP | +€27m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here | −€5m · <0.01% of GDP | −€14m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Extra sales to Ukraine | – | −€28m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Arms Ukraine bought here | – | −€26m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Aid spent here on energy, relief and rebuilding | – | −€13m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Russian oil bought via other countries | −€0.45bn · −0.09% of GDP | +€0.16bn · +0.02% of GDP |
| Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold | +€0.27bn · +0.05% of GDP | −€11.1bn · −1.0% of GDP |
| Company taxes paid in Russia | +€46m · <0.01% of GDP | −€0.16bn · −0.02% of GDP |
| Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices | −€46m · <0.01% of GDP | −€20.5bn · −1.9% of GDP |
| Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions | −€35m · <0.01% of GDP | −€1bn · −0.10% of GDP |
| Company profits in Russia | +€33m · <0.01% of GDP | −€0.30bn · −0.03% of GDP |
| Services bought from Russia | +€23m · <0.01% of GDP | −€40m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Services sold to Russia | +€15m · <0.01% of GDP | −€0.14bn · −0.01% of GDP |
| Sellers' gain on sales to Russia | +€12m · <0.01% of GDP | −€89m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Rosatom projects and Russian state loans | – | +€0.61bn · +0.06% of GDP |
| Shipping and insuring Russian oil | – | −€0.11bn · −0.01% of GDP |
| Payment agents settling Russia's trade | – | −€92m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad | – | −€21m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Weapons bought from Russia | – | +€13m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Gold and hidden payments to Russia | – | −€5m · <0.01% of GDP |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia

## Year by year

| Year | Country | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | Israel | +€87m | +€28m | +€115m |
| – | Türkiye | +€112m | −€15.1bn | −€15.0bn |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | Israel | +€23m | −€581m | −€558m |
| – | Türkiye | +€29m | −€5.2bn | −€5.2bn |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | Israel | +€10m | +€173m | +€183m |
| – | Türkiye | +€1m | −€6.2bn | −€6.2bn |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | Israel | +€10m | +€116m | +€126m |
| – | Türkiye | +€8m | −€4.3bn | −€4.3bn |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | Israel | +€9m | +€126m | +€135m |
| – | Türkiye | +€10m | −€1.9bn | −€1.9bn |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Related

- [Israel](https://warbalance.org/country/israel/)
- [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/)
- [Türkiye vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/turkiye-vs-india/)
- [China vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-turkiye/)
- [Iran vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/iran-vs-turkiye/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/