# China vs Kazakhstan: support for Ukraine and trade with Russia since 2022

China: Toward Russia by 0.75% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Kazakhstan: Toward Ukraine by 0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

Support for Ukraine in euros: China €0.52bn, Kazakhstan €20m. More in euros: Kazakhstan; more as a share of GDP: Kazakhstan.

[China →](https://warbalance.org/#CHN) [Kazakhstan →](https://warbalance.org/#KAZ)

These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.

## Side by side

| # | Country | Net | Support for Ukraine | Russia kept from trade, vs no war | Paid Russia since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| – | [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · −€91 per personlikely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russiavery likely · >99% | −€0.52bn · <0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €128bn more · 0.74% of GDP morevery likely · >99% | €547bn · 3.2% of GDP |
| – | [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/) | +0.02% · +€55m · +€3 per personlikely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraineessentially zero | +€20m · <0.01% of GDPessentially zero | €35m less · 0.01% of GDP lessessentially zero | €78.7bn · 32.5% of GDP |

Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.

## What makes up each number

| Measure | China | Kazakhstan |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Purchases from Ukraine vs no war | −€0.57bn · <0.01% of GDP | +€14m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine | +€89m · <0.01% of GDP | +€4m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Aid spent here on energy, relief and rebuilding | −€20m · <0.01% of GDP | – |
| Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here | −€20m · <0.01% of GDP | – |
| Government aid to Ukraine | +€2m · <0.01% of GDP | +€2m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Extra services sold to Ukraine | – | −€2m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Cost of hosting refugees from Ukraine | – | +€2m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold | −€82.5bn · −0.48% of GDP | +€2.6bn · +1.1% of GDP |
| Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions | −€18bn · −0.10% of GDP | −€0.64bn · −0.26% of GDP |
| Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices | −€15.4bn · −0.09% of GDP | −€1.2bn · −0.50% of GDP |
| Company profits in Russia | −€4bn · −0.02% of GDP | −€38m · −0.02% of GDP |
| Company taxes paid in Russia | −€3.7bn · −0.02% of GDP | −€32m · −0.01% of GDP |
| Sellers' gain on sales to Russia | −€2.4bn · −0.01% of GDP | +€19m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Russian oil bought via other countries | −€0.65bn · <0.01% of GDP | −€35m · −0.01% of GDP |
| Gold and hidden payments to Russia | −€0.48bn · <0.01% of GDP | – |
| Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects | −€0.42bn · <0.01% of GDP | – |
| Shipping and insuring Russian oil | −€0.21bn · <0.01% of GDP | −€1m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Payment agents settling Russia's trade | −€0.18bn · <0.01% of GDP | −€0.14bn · −0.06% of GDP |
| Weapons bought from Russia | +€0.18bn · <0.01% of GDP | +€13m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Services bought from Russia | −€45m · <0.01% of GDP | +€0.12bn · +0.05% of GDP |
| Weapons and troops sent to Russia | −€39m · <0.01% of GDP | – |
| Services sold to Russia | +€27m · <0.01% of GDP | +€14m · <0.01% of GDP |
| Rosatom projects and Russian state loans | +€17m · <0.01% of GDP | – |
| Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad | – | −€0.69bn · −0.28% of GDP |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia

## Year by year

| Year | Country | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | China | −€161m | −€20.8bn | −€21.0bn |
| – | Kazakhstan | +€2m | −€332m | −€330m |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | China | −€20m | −€29.2bn | −€29.2bn |
| – | Kazakhstan | +€5m | +€254m | +€258m |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | China | −€59m | −€34.7bn | −€34.8bn |
| – | Kazakhstan | +€4m | −€367m | −€363m |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | China | −€184m | −€22.5bn | −€22.6bn |
| – | Kazakhstan | +€7m | +€67m | +€74m |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | China | −€97m | −€20.7bn | −€20.8bn |
| – | Kazakhstan | +€2m | +€413m | +€415m |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Related

- [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/)
- [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/)
- [India vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/india-vs-china/)
- [United States vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-china/)
- [China vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-turkiye/)
- [China vs Iran](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-iran/)
- [Brazil vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/brazil-vs-china/)
- [China vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-japan/)
- [United Arab Emirates vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-arab-emirates-vs-china/)
- [China vs South Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-south-korea/)
- [China vs North Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-north-korea/)
- [Kazakhstan vs Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/compare/kazakhstan-vs-uzbekistan/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-kazakhstan/